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ABSTRACT. For more than forty years, jurisprudence has been dominated by the Hart-
Dworkin debate. The debate starts from the premise that our legal practices generate rights and
obligations that are distinctively legal, and the question at issue is how the content of these rights
and obligations is determined. Positivists say that their content is determined ultimately or ex-
clusively by social facts. Anti-positivists say that moral facts must play a part in determining their
content. In this Essay, I argue that the debate rests on a mistake. Our legal practices do not gen-
erate rights and obligations that are distinctively legal. At best, they generate moral rights and
obligations, some of which we label legal. I defend this view by drawing analogies with other
normative practices, like making promises, posting rules, and playing games. And I try to explain
why it looks like legal practices generate distinctively legal rights and obligations even though
they do not. I conclude with some thoughts about the questions that jurisprudence should pur-
sue in the wake of the Hart-Dworkin debate.
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INTRODUCTION
For more than forty years, jurisprudence has been dominated by the Hart-
Dworkin debate. The terrain of the debate has shifted several times, but it is
not hard to say what is in dispute. Hart and his heirs contend that the content
of the law-the set of rights, obligations, privileges, and powers in force in a
legal system -is determined by social facts. Dworkin and his followers counter
that moral facts play a part in determining law's content. Some find the debate
moribund, but the truth is that the last decade of the debate has been as pro-
ductive as any. Even though most participants defend positions that have been
familiar for twenty years or more, the arguments advanced are increasingly so-
phisticated. They have not resolved the debate, but they have deepened our
understanding of it. Still, I am sympathetic to the prescription of those who
think the debate stale: we should move on.
We should move on because we can. There is a way out of thisfly-bottle.' In-
deed, as Wittgenstein might have supposed, we are trapped by our own confu-
sion, or at least that is how it now seems to me. The position I am going to de-
fend is not completely novel. In recent years, Mark Greenberg has developed a
view that shares much in common with it.2 But Greenberg sees himself as an-
swering the question at issue in the Hart-Dworkin debate, rather than moving
beyond it. Moreover, as Jeremy Waldron recently observed,3 Dworkin himself
seems to have hit on something like the view I will defend toward the end of
his life, and I think he glimpsed it much earlier. But for most of his career,
Dworkin was buzzing around the fly-bottle with the rest of us, developing and
defending a view that participates in the confusion that I hope to free us from.
I'll return to this history later. For now, I just want to emphasize that my aim is
1. "What is your aim in philosophy?- To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle." LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 309 ( 3d ed. 1967).
2. For the most recent and complete statement of Greenberg's view, see Mark Greenberg, The
Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288 (2014) [hereinafter Greenberg, The Moral Im-
pact Theory of Law]. That is the latest in a series of important papers that develop Green-
berg's distinctive take on jurisprudence. Other recent papers in the series include Mark
Greenberg, The Standard Picture and Its Discontents, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 39 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011) [hereinafter Greenberg, The Standard Pic-
ture], and Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of
Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217
(Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011) (hereinafter Greenberg, Legislation as Communi-
cation?].
3. Jeremy Waldron, Jurisprudence for Hedgehogs (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13-45, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2290309 [http://perma.cc/D2XZ-S34L]. Greenberg makes the same observation in The
Moral Impact Theory of Law, supra note 2, at 13oo n.28.
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to reject the question at the center of the Hart-Dworkin debate, rather than de-
fend anyone's answer to it.
Of course, an end to the Hart-Dworkin debate would not mark the end of
jurisprudence. But it would allow us to reorient jurisprudence toward a differ-
ent end. For far too long, the field has been preoccupied by a question that is
poorly formed. The time has come to set it aside and take up a better one. But
before we can set a new end for jurisprudence, we must free ourselves from the
old one. To start, we should remind ourselves what the fly-bottle looks like
from the inside.
I. THE FLY-BOTTLE
We'll turn to the Hart-Dworkin debate in a moment, but I don't want to
start there. Instead, I want to start with a sign that is just around the corner
from my house. I rarely give the sign much thought, but it poses all sorts of
puzzles. Some are historical: Who put the sign there? Who decided to put it
there? Who decided it would say, "SPEED LIMIT 35"? In addition to the his-
torical puzzles, there are sociological ones: Do people notice the sign? Does it
affect their behavior? Still other puzzles are normative: Should the sign have a
different number on it? Should it be a bit further down the road? Should it be
there at all? And then there is the puzzle that interests me the most, which is
also normative, but in a different way: Does the sign affect how people ought
to behave? If it does, how and why? What are the normative upshots of the fact
that the sign is where it is and says what it says?
Some answers are easy enough. To start, the sign has prudential upshots. It
signals something about the speed at which it is safe to drive. Assuming the
sign got there in the normal way, its text and location reflect decisions made by
people with expertise in traffic control. Given the characteristics of the road
and the neighborhood surrounding it, it may not be safe to drive much faster
than thirty-five miles per hour. Now that might be true quite apart from the
sign, in which case the sign does not create new reasons but instead signals rea-
sons that I already have but might not recognize. But the sign might also create
new reasons. Driving is in part a coordination problem. It is safest to drive
roughly the same speed as everyone else. If other drivers will react to the sign
by traveling about thirty-five miles per hour, prudence may require that I do
the same. And prudence may have even more to say. If the police are likely to
ticket people who drive in excess of speeds posted on signs like this one, then
prudence may require that I keep my speed down to avoid a fine.
The sign also has moral upshots. Some are closely related to the prudential
ones. To the extent that I have moral reasons not to impose excessive risks on
others, the presence of the sign, and the reactions other drivers are likely to
have to it, may make it the case that I am morally required to drive about thir-
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ty-five miles per hour. But there are other ways the sign might make a moral
difference. Perhaps the people who put the sign there have the moral authority
to decide how fast I should drive. If so, I may be morally obligated to do as
they have instructed. That is, I may be morally obligated to drive no more than
thirty-five miles per hour. Or perhaps I have promised my wife that I won't get
any more speeding tickets. If so, I may be morally obligated not to act in ways
that would lead the police to ticket me. That might require that I drive at less
than the speed posted on the sign; more likely, it requires that I not drive too
much above it.
Many people assume that the sign has yet another kind of normative up-
shot. They say that whatever the sign requires as a matter of prudence or mo-
rality, it legally requires that I drive no more than thirty-five miles per hour.4
That's a familiar thought, but I should note one complication with it. Some
people who speak this way think that our legal practices generate a distinct
domain of legal normativity, separate from other normative domains, like mo-
rality and prudence.5 To these people's way of thinking, a complete list of the
sign's normative consequences would need to include its distinctively legal
consequences alongside its moral and prudential ones. Other people, however,
would deny that the legal requirements imposed by the sign are properly listed
with its moral and prudential requirements. Those latter requirements, they
might say, are inherently normative, while the legal requirements need only
purport to be normative and, indeed, might not be. This view comes in a varie-
ty of flavors. The most common holds that when we refer to legal requirements
4. Of course the sign doesn't have this upshot on its own, and it may not have it at all if the
sign did not get there in the right way. If there is a legal requirement that I drive less than
the speed posted on the sign, it is presumably a consequence of a complicated set of facts in-
volving, among other things, adoption of the statute that authorized signs of this sort. It
may even be that the sign reflects the legal requirement but does not constitutively contrib-
ute to it.
5. When I talk about different domains of normativity, what I have in mind are different ways
we might carve normative space. Take, for example, the space of reasons. Within that space,
there are moral reasons, prudential reasons, epistemic reasons, aesthetic reasons, and other
sorts of reasons - possibly even legal reasons. We can think of each of these labels as picking
out a normative domain, and some of these normative domains may be distinct from others.
For example, it is possible that our aesthetic reasons do not overlap with our moral reasons,
in which case those domains would be distinct from one another. I take no view on whether
morality and aesthetics are distinct, nor do I take a view on the relationship between morali-
ty and prudence. The point I am making here is that some philosophers think that our legal
practices generate a domain of legal reasons that is distinct from morality, prudence, and
other sorts of reasons. See Jules L. Coleman, The Architecture ofjurisprudence, 121 YALE L.J. 2,
78 (2o11) ("Law claims to create reasons for acting. Some think that it claims to create a dis-
tinct class of reasons for acting-legal reasons. Arguably, Hart held the view that legal obli-
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we are referring to the law's point of view on our moral requirements. I'll say
more about this later. For now, I just want to note that if legal requirements are
not genuinely normative, they are at least quasi-normative, as they traffic in
normative notions, like obligation and right. And that is enough for our pur-
poses. Indeed, the thought that traffic signs and the legal practices they are
embedded in have distinctively legal upshots-that is, normative or quasi-
normative upshots that are legal but not moral or prudential -is the glass that
makes the fly-bottle. And it is that thought that I am going to propose we re-
ject.
Why is the thought that legal practices have distinctively legal upshots the
glass that makes the fly-bottle? Because that thought sets the terms of the
Hart-Dworkin debate. Indeed, without that thought, there would be nothing
to debate. Let me show you what I mean. Suppose that I tell you that when you
are on this particular road, you are legally obligated to drive no more than thir-
ty-five miles per hour. And now suppose that you ask me why that is. There
are two ways to hear your question. You might want to know why the people
who set that requirement set that one, rather than a different one. That is, you
might want to know why they set the speed limit at thirty-five, rather than
twenty-five or forty-five. But you might be after something else. You might
want to know what makes it the case that you are legally required to drive no
more than thirty-five miles per hour. That is, you might want to know what
facts make that fact obtain. After all, the fact that you are legally required to
drive no more than thirty-five miles per hour is not a basic fact about the world
as we find it, in the way that we might suppose some fundamental physical
facts are. There are further facts that make the speed limit what it is, and it is
reasonable to suppose that we could figure out which facts those are.6
Without doubt, some social facts are among the further facts that deter-
mine the speed limit. In other words, the speed limit is what it is at least in part
because of what certain people said and did. Someone, we can be reasonably
sure, decided to set the speed limit at thirty-five rather than at twenty-five or
forty-five, and that decision is one of the facts that makes the speed limit what
it is. Everyone in the Hart-Dworkin debate agrees about that. What they disa-
gree about is whether all the facts that figure in fixing the legal requirement are
6. See Mark Greenberg, How Facts Make Law, in EXPLORING LAw's EMPIRE: THE JURISPRU-
DENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 225, 226-27 (Scott Hershovitz ed., 20o6) ("[N]o legal-content
facts are metaphysically basic or ultimate facts about the universe, facts for which there is
nothing to say about what makes them the case. Legal-content facts, like facts about the
meaning of words or facts about international exchange rates ... [], hold in virtue of more
basic facts.").
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social facts, or whether there might be (or must be) some normative facts that
figure in determining the content of the law too.'
Roughly speaking, there are three positions in the debate. According to ex-
clusive legal positivists, the content of the law is determined solely by social facts.
If this view is right, then when we set out to explain why you are legally re-
quired to drive no more than thirty-five miles per hour, we may point only to
facts about what people have said, done, thought, and so on. It would be a mis-
take for us to point to any normative facts about what people should say, do, or
think. The reason it would be a mistake is that facts like that play no part in de-
termining the content of the law. Anti-positivists hold the opposite view. They
think that to fully explain why the speed limit is thirty-five, we must point to
some normative facts alongside the social facts. An anti-positivist might argue,
for example, that we must point to moral facts that determine the legal rele-
vance of actions taken by different people or institutions. Something of a mid-
dle ground is occupied by inclusive legal positivists, who hold that moral facts
might play a part in determining the content of the law, but only if the relevant
social practices assign them that role. Inclusive legal positivism is a form of
positivism because it holds that social facts are the ultimate determinants of the
7. I am describing the Hart-Dworkin debate as many philosophers working today understand
it. See Scott J. Shapiro, The "Hart-Dworkin" Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed, in
RONALD DwoRKIN 22, 50 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007) ("The particulars [of the Hart-
Dworkin debate] have changed, but the basic issue, and its fundamental importance, re-
mains the same as it did forty years ago. Is the law ultimately grounded in social facts alone,
or do moral facts also determine the existence and the content of the law?"); Greenberg, su-
pra note 6, at 225 ("[A] central-perhaps the central-debate in the philosophy of law is a
debate over whether value facts are among the determinants of the content of the
law .... ."); see also Coleman, supra note 5, at 61 ("Arguably the most basic question in juris-
prudence is a metaphysical one: What are the sources of legal content?").
However, some philosophers would formulate the debate differently. For example, John
Gardner suggests that the distinctive thesis of legal positivism is this: "[i]n any legal system,
whether a given norm is legally valid, and hence whether it forms part of the law of that sys-
tem, depends on its sources, not its merits (where its merits, in the relevant sense, include
the merits of its sources)." John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5 1/2 Myths, 46 AM. J. JmiRs. 199,
201 (2001). I think the formulation that I present in the text better locates what is at issue
between positivists and anti-positivists, in part because many prominent anti-positivists re-
ject the idea that the law is composed of norms. See, e.g., RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 76 (1978) ("My point was not that 'the law' contains a fixed number of
standards, some of which are rules and other principles. Indeed, I want to oppose the idea
that 'the law' is a fixed set of standards of any sort."); see also Greenberg, The Standard Pic-
ture, supra note 2, at 59-6o (suggesting that "[t]here are no criteria of validity in the sense of
criteria that apply to individual norms rather than to the content of the law as a whole"). But
the argument that follows can be adapted to fit Gardner's formulation of the debate; instead
of denying that our legal practices generate distinctively legal rights, obligations, privileges,
and powers, we would instead deny that they generate distinctively legal norms (that is,
norms that are legal but not moral or prudential).
1166
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content of the law, and that the law might be determined by social facts alone.
But it allows that people might choose to have the content of their law depend
on moral facts, as they seem to do, for example, when they prohibit punish-
ment that is cruel, or confer rights to legal protections that are equal.
The last several decades of jurisprudence have seen a pitched battle be-
tween these views. But for all their differences, they share something in com-
mon. And that should not come as a surprise, since what they share is a condi-
tion of their coming into conflict. All three views offer an answer to the same
question. The question is what facts determine the content of the law. In dif-
ferent ways, all three views purport to provide a metaphysical account of our
legal rights, obligations, privileges, and powers. In other words, they purport
to tell us what makes it the case that we have the legal rights, obligations, privi-
leges, and powers that we do.
II. THE TROUBLES
So framed, the Hart-Dworkin debate is important. The law can make a
great deal of difference in our lives, and we often disagree about what it de-
mands. An account of how and why the law requires what it does should illu-
minate those controversies and maybe even contribute to their resolution." It is
no mystery, then, that the Hart-Dworkin debate has held our attention for as
long as it has. But it remains devilishly difficult to resolve, and I want to quick-
ly review some of the problems that make it so.
Let's start by trying to untangle the metaphysics of just one legal obliga-
tion. Suppose you ask a lawyer what makes it the case that you are legally obli-
gated to drive no more than thirty-five miles per hour on the street near my
house. She might tell you that an administrative agency set the speed limit on
that road and posted the sign to inform you of it. But you might ask: why does
that sequence of events have any bearing on what I am legally obligated to do?
And she might reply that the administrative agency was acting pursuant to a
statute adopted by the state legislature and signed by the Governor. Unsatis-
fied, you renew your question: why do the actions of the state legislature and
Governor have any bearing on what I am legally obligated to do? If she's not
annoyed with you, she might point to the state constitution, which says that
the legislature is authorized to adopt statutes, subject to the Governor's veto.
Ever the contrarian, you push one more time: why does the text of the state
constitution have any bearing on what I am legally obligated to do? If your
8. See ScoTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 29 (2011) (suggesting that the "resolution of certain legal
disputes depends on the ability to resolve certain philosophical disputes as well").
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lawyer remembers her jurisprudence, she will know that Hart had an answer to
this question.
According to Hart, every legal system has a foundational rule -Hart called
it the rule of recognition -that identifies the other rules that are part of that
system.9 Those other rules establish people's legal rights, obligations, privileg-
es, and powers. The rule of recognition is not validated by some further rule.
Instead, it is a social rule -that is, a rule whose existence and content are fixed
by a social practice.' ° Roughly, the right kind of practice exists when most legal
officials converge on criteria for identifying law, treat their convergence as sup-
plying a common standard, and regard themselves as obligated to comply with
it.' The content of the rule of recognition is fixed by the criteria that legal offi-
cials converge on and take the proper attitude towards. If your lawyer remem-
bers all this, she might tell you that the practice of legal officials around here is
to recognize rules made in accord with the procedures in the state constitution
as legal rules.
Hart's picture is elegant. But it has drawn lots of critics, and even some
positivists worry about it. They worry because it seems to license inferences
that run afoul of David Hume's famous injunction that you cannot derive an
ought from an is.' 2 Hart invites us to derive a normative statement (that is, a
claim about what you are legally obligated to do) from descriptive statements
about the social practice among legal officials around here. But if Hume is
right, inferences from merely descriptive statements to normative statements
are invalid. Of course, Hume might have been wrong, and some philosophers
think so. But anyone who would defend a legal positivism like Hart's must
show Hume wrong or navigate around his injunction that you cannot derive an
ought from an is.
Many contemporary positivists take the second tack, and there are several
different strategies on offer. I want to highlight the most common strategy,
both because it seems to me the most promising and because it will figure in
the argument to follow. As I mentioned earlier, some people think that there is
a distinctively legal domain of normativity, separate from other normative do-
mains like morality and prudence. 13 Hart held a view like this; he thought that
9. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 1OO (3d ed. 2012).
10. See id. at 1no.
ii. For Hart's introduction of the idea of a social rule, see id. at 55-56.
1a. See DAVID HuME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469-70 (Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge ed.,
1978); see also SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 46-47; Coleman, supra note 5, at 77-78.
13. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. If you still find this idea elusive, the following pic-
ture might help. Suppose that you set out to list all of your obligations, and you start with
your moral obligations. Once you've listed them, you ask whether you have any obligations
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the legal concept of obligation was normative but not moral. 4 Other positiv-
ists, however, think that law employs the same concept of obligation as morali-
ty, so that claims about a person's legal obligations are really claims about her
moral obligations. But they think that these claims are qualified in an im-
portant way. To say that a person has a legal obligation is not to say that she
has a moral obligation full stop. Rather, it is to say that she has a moral obliga-
tionfrom the law's point of view."5 On this sort of picture, when you talk about
your legal obligations, you are talking about the moral obligations the law
thinks you have, which is roughly akin to talking about the moral obligations
your grandmother thinks you have. A claim about what obligations your
grandmother thinks you have would be a descriptive claim, not a normative
one. And the same is true of claims about legal obligations, according to posi-
tivists who hold this sort of view.' 6 To put it in the language I used earlier,
claims about legal obligations are, on this picture, quasi-normative; they ap-
pear to be normative, but they are not really.
This strategy may help positivists escape Hume, but it raises new ques-
tions. It is easy to grasp the idea that my grandmother has views about what I
am morally obligated to do. But the thought that the law has a point of view on
what I am morally obligated to do is more elusive. The idea cannot be that the
law has views in just the same way that my grandmother does. 7 But if the
law's point of view is not the point of view of any particular person, we must
figure out how all the different aspects of legal practice combine to generate the
law's point of view. And it is far from obvious how that happens. Indeed, Mark
Greenberg has argued that legal practices are always consistent with many pos-
that are not yet on the list. If the answer is yes, and you think your legal obligations are
among the ones that have not yet been listed, then you think that there is a legal domain of
normativity that is distinct from the moral domain, at least in the sense relevant here.
14. H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 16o-61 (1982).
15. See SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 184-88; see also JOSEPH RAz, PRACTICAL REASONS AND NORMS
171-77 (1975); Coleman, supra note 5, at 78 ("Law claims to create reasons for acting. Some
think that it claims to create a distinct class of reasons for acting-legal reasons. Arguably,
Hart held the view that legal obligation constituted a distinctive kind of obligation which
was not just a species of moral obligations. Others, again including positivists like Raz and
me, believe that the law claims to have an impact on what we have moral reason to do.").
16. See SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 188.
17. For a discussion of what it might mean to say that the law has a point of view, see Coleman,
supra note 5, at 22, which suggests that "[t]alk of 'the law's point of view' is a way of ex-
pressing an idea about law: namely, that there is an underlying moral theory that is implicit
in the existence of law, according to which the law's directives not only turn out to be sys-
tematically connected to one another, and thus satisfy the demands of rationality and coher-
ence, but also turn out to be morally legitimate."
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sible sets of legal requirements,s such that social facts are, by themselves, inca-
pable of fixing the law's point of view.
There's much more to say here, but we're not trying to resolve the Hart-
Dworkin debate. We're just trying to appreciate why it's so persistent. So let's
move on to a new set of problems. We started with Hart's answer to the ques-
tion how the content of the law is constituted. And then we considered a worry
that many positivists have about Hart's picture. But we haven't yet said any-
thing about the worries that Dworkin raised about it, and we should spend
some time there, since it is, after all, the Hart-Dworkin debate that we are try-
ing to get a grip on.
Over the years, Dworkin lodged many objections to Hart's positivism, but
we can boil the main part of his critique down to two complaints. First,
Dworkin argued that legal officials do not converge on criteria for identifying
law in the way that Hart supposed.19 Those criteria, he contended, are con-
stantly contested, and not just at the periphery." Take, for example, what you
might think is a basic question that any rule of recognition would answer:
what legal rule is generated by an act of legislation? Around here, at least, legal
officials disagree. Some think that the rule generated is the rule expressed in
the text, whatever the legislature might have intended in adopting it.' Others
think that the legal rule generated is the rule that the legislature intended to
adopt, whether or not that rule was fully or accurately captured in the text it
approved. ' Hart had said that the rule of recognition is indeterminate as to any
point on which legal officials fail to converge, with the consequence that the
law is indeterminate on those questions too.'3 But Dworkin observed that dis-
putes of this sort don't lead legal officials to conclude that the law is indetermi-
nate. Even when judges can plainly see that they have not converged on criteria
18. See Greenberg, supra note 6, at 253 (arguing that "law practices cannot themselves determine
the content of the law because they cannot unilaterally determine their own contribution to
the content of the law").
ig. See RONALD DwORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE ch. 1 (1986).
zo. Id. at 40-43.
21. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
16-18 (1997).
22. The famous-or infamous-decision in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S.
457 (1892), exemplifies this approach. The Court observed: "It is a familiar rule, that a thing
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its
spirit, nor within the intention of its makers." Id. at 459. But there are plenty of recent cases
in which courts find that the legal rule generated by an act of legislation is not the rule ex-
pressed in the statute's text. See, e.g., Saadeh v. Farouki, 107 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (dis-
cussed in Greenberg, Legislation as Communication?, supra note 2, at 242-43).
23. HART, supra note 9, at 150-54.
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for identifying the law of their community, they nevertheless insist that there is
law to be applied.'
Dworkin's second complaint was that Hart could not explain all of the
ways in which legal officials disagree about what the law is.25 Sometimes, they
disagree about what the law is because they disagree about some or another so-
cial fact. Hart has no trouble with that. But sometimes, Dworkin observed, le-
gal officials disagree about what the law is, even though they agree on all the
social facts.26 On Hart's picture, these sorts of disagreements are mysterious:
since social facts constitute the law, any disagreement about what the law is
should rest on a disagreement about some or another social fact. This puts
Hart in the awkward position of denying the possibility of disagreements that
seem rather routine.2'
In Law's Empire, Dworkin advanced a different picture of how our legal
rights, obligations, privileges, and powers are determined. Roughly, Dworkin
argued that the content of the law is a function of the principles that best fit
and justify past political decisions about the state's use of force., s According to
Dworkin, people who agree on all the social facts can nevertheless disagree
about what the law is because they have moral disagreements about which
principles best fit and justify their community's political history.29 Those who
hold that the legal rule generated by an act of legislation is the one the legisla-
ture intended to adopt might think so in part because they believe that best
serves the values of democracy. In contrast, those who hold that the text reigns
supreme might think so in part because they think democracy better served by
holding the legislature to the words it chose. The parties to a debate like this
disagree about the criteria for identifying law in their community, and they
know that they disagree. But they think their answers not merely better, but
right.30 And that, Dworkin suggested, accounts for the fact that they regard the
law as determinate, even though they disagree about what it is.
Of course, positivists are not persuaded by all this. They argue that positiv-
ism can account for the sorts of disagreements Dworkin observed, which they
24. DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 37-39.
25. Id. at 5-11, 33-43.
a6. Id. at 5.
27. Id. at 5-11, 33-43.
a8. Id. at 93.
29. Id. at 87-88.
30. Id. at io.
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often doubt are genuine anyway.3 Moreover, some positivists worry that law
couldn't serve the purposes that it is supposed to serve if it worked the way
Dworkin says it does (though, I might add, they don't all agree on what those
purposes are, or even whether law has purposes in the first place).' Finally,
some positivists charge that Dworkin is embarrassed by the existence of moral-
ly abhorrent laws and legal systems. 3 Now, I should say-because it will be
helpful to have in mind later-I think this last worry is overblown. Dworkin
never claimed that there are moral constraints on the existence of particular
laws and legal systems, in the way that some natural lawyers from long ago
might have done. 4 So he's not embarrassed by the mere existence of evil laws
or legal systems. But they do pose a problem for his view nonetheless. The
problem is that evil laws seem to impose legal obligations, even though they
cannot be justified by any morally attractive principles. It seems apt to say, for
example, that the Fugitive Slave Act obligated federal marshals to arrest those
accused of being runaway slaves, notwithstanding the grave injustice involved.
Any plausible anti-positivism must explain this, or explain it away, and many
find Dworkin's attempts to do so unsatisfying.
The point is not that Dworkin's critics are right; maybe they are, and may-
be they aren't. As I said, I'm not trying to resolve the Hart-Dworkin debate.
I'm just trying to convey a quick sense of the troubles that attend any attempt
to sort out the metaphysics of our distinctively legal rights, obligations, privi-
31. For attempts to account for the kinds of disagreements Dworkin observed from within a
positivist framework, see SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 381-84; and Jules L. Coleman, Negative
and Positive Positivism, ii J. LEGAL STUD. 139,156-62 (1982).
32. You can see arguments of this form in SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 310, which argues that law
could not settle things in the way that plans do if it works the way Dworkin says it does, and
in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLI-
TICS 2o8-10 (1994), which argues that law could not serve the mediating role of authority if
it works the way Dworkin says it does. Hart, however, was skeptical that law has a purpose
"beyond providing guides to human conduct and standards of criticism of such conduct."
HART, supra note 9, at 249. For further discussion of purposes and positivism, see Scott
Hershovitz, The Model of Plans and the Prospects for Positivism, 125 ETHICS 152 (2014).
33. See, e.g., John Gardner, Law's Aims in Law's Empire, in EXPLORING LAW'S EMPIRE: THE Ju- .
RISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 207, 217, 222-23 (Scott Hershovitz ed., 2006) (suggest-
ing that Dworkin's acknowledgement that there is a sense in which Nazi law was plainly law
commits him to a form of positivism).
34. Dworkin drew a distinction between (i) the sociological concept of law, which we employ
when designating certain institutional structures as legal systems; (ii) the taxonomic concept
of law, which we employ when we pick out discrete rules or standards as laws; and (iii) the
doctrinal concept of law, which we employ when we make claims about what the law of a
particular community requires. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 2-5 (2006).
Dworkin said that his interest was always in the doctrinal concept, not the sociological or
taxonomic concepts. See id. at 234.
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leges, and powers. And perhaps the only conclusion I am confident of is this:
there are a lot of them.
III. THE WAY OUT
There are a lot of them, and there's an awful lot more to the Hart-Dworkin
debate than we just canvassed. There are books about it, and there will be
many more. But there don't have to be. There is a way out of the debate, and
indeed, the way out is as simple as the way in: to escape the debate, we could
simply abandon the thought that starts it up. That is, we could abandon the
thought that, in addition to their moral and prudential upshots, legal practices
have distinctively legal upshots. This might sound radical; later, I will try to
make it seem less so. But for now, just note that if we did abandon this
thought, we would still wonder what the law requires of us. The only differ-
ence would be that when we did so, we'd take ourselves to be engaged in a
moral inquiry, or perhaps a prudential one, rather than a distinctively legal
one. That is, we'd take ourselves to be asking what our legal practices give us
moral or prudential reasons to do.35 Of course, it might be difficult to identify
the moral and prudential upshots of our legal practices. But whatever challeng-
es those inquiries might pose, they would not present any metaphysical prob-
lems of a distinctively legal sort, which philosophers of law might take it as
their task to solve.
Now, it should not come as a surprise that we could stop the Hart-
Dworkin debate if we denied the existence of its subject. The question is
whether we should stop it. And though we might welcome the opportunity to
dispense with a difficult debate, the fact that the debate is difficult does not
give us good reason to deny the existence of its subject. (The metaphysics of
consciousness are hard to figure, but that does not give us much, if any, reason
to doubt that consciousness exists.) Still, the possibility that we could stop the
Hart-Dworkin debate raises a question: did we have good reason to take it up
in the first place? As we just saw, the thought that legal practices have distinc-
tively legal upshots lands us in a mess of trouble. If we don't have good ground
for it, we should drop it, and the Hart-Dworkin debate too.
I suspect that most people just think it obvious that legal practices have dis-
tinctively legal upshots. And for good reason. We regularly draw a distinction
35. As I noted earlier, moral and prudential reasons are not the only sorts of reasons; we have
aesthetic reasons, epistemic reasons, and other sorts too. See supra note 5. In this Essay, I fo-
cus on the moral and prudential consequences of our legal practices because those practices
are generally aimed at adjusting moral and prudential reasons, rather than reasons of other
sorts. But nothing I say should be taken to indicate that legal practices do not affect other
sorts of reasons. Indeed, I am sure that they do.
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between what we are legally required to do and what we are morally required
to do, and we are live to the possibility that legal and moral requirements won't
match up. We often face legal requirements that we doubt are accompanied by
moral requirements. And we often face moral requirements that we know are
not backed by legal requirements. The most straightforward way to make sense
of this is to suppose that legal practices generate distinctively legal rights, obli-
gations, privileges, and powers, which can and do differ from their moral
counterparts.
This is a simple, powerful picture, and if it is right, then we cannot escape
the Hart-Dworkin debate or the troubles that come with it. If we have distinc-
tively legal rights, obligations, privileges, and powers, then we cannot avoid
asking metaphysical questions about their constitution. But I don't think this
picture is right. Indeed, I think there is something quite puzzling about it. The
world is full of practices that are law-like, in that they aim to shape the norms
that govern our lives. But we don't take the vast majority of these practices to
give rise to their own distinct domain of normativity, or even quasi-
normativity, in the way that this picture supposes that legal practices do. In the
next section, I want to illustrate this puzzle with a series of vignettes that have
little to do with law. What I hope to show is that we can navigate increasingly
complex normative practices without generating the problems that preoccupy
philosophers of law. If I am right, then we should wonder whether we can nav-
igate law without generating those problems too.
IV. HOUSE RULES
We can start by thinking through the normative upshots of another sign.
But this time we're aiming for something that's not connected to law, or at
least not very directly. So let's try this: Imagine that you have rented a house at
the beach. When you arrive, you notice a sign in the foyer, which reads, "Leave
your cares at the door." Should you leave your cares at the door? Maybe. It de-
pends on what your cares are and why you are visiting the beach. If your cares
are not pressing and the point of the trip is relaxation, then perhaps you should
leave your cares at the door. If, instead, you have come to the beach because it
is a quiet place to work on the things you care about, then you probably should
not leave your cares at the door.
Of course, all of that would be true even if there were no sign enjoining you
to leave your cares at the door. Does the sign play a role in determining wheth-
er or not you should leave your cares at the door? Of course, it might play a
causal role in determining whether or not you do leave your cares at the door.
The reminder may put you in mind to relax. But it is hard to see how the sign
bears on the question whether you should leave your cares at the door. After
all, it is difficult to imagine that the owner of the house has standing to de-
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mand that you do. And even if she does, it's not clear that she intended to make
a demand through the sign; she might just have liked the way it looked. It
would be a different story, of course, if your spouse told you to relax. Her de-
mand might give you a reason. But the sign does not.
Now suppose that the sign says, "No smoking." Should you refrain from
smoking? To be sure, you have reasons not to smoke quite apart from what the
sign says. Smoking is harmful, to you and others. But unlike the first sign, this
one has normative consequences, at least assuming the owner put it there. To
the extent you are interested in avoiding conflict with the owner, the sign gives
you a prudential reason to avoid smoking. And it probably gives you moral rea-
sons too. The sign tells you that the owner of the house does not want you to
smoke, and because smoke lingers behind, she has some stake in whether you
do. Indeed, the sign might even obligate you not to smoke, on the plausible as-
sumption that the owner of a house has a right to decide whether people may
smoke in it.,6 Of course, we might wonder whether she has done enough to in-
voke that right. It may be that she should have given you notice up front if she
intended to restrict your smoking, rather than leave it to a sign you would see
only on arrival.
But for our purposes it does not matter whether you should avoid smoking,
or, for that matter, leave your cares at the door. The point of these vignettes
lies in what I have not said about them. In sorting through the normative up-
shots of these signs, I have not suggested that there is a distinct domain of
normativity, or even quasi-normativity, unique to the rental house or its sign-
age. I did not, for example, suggest that the first sign generated a "rental
house" obligation to leave your cares at the door, separate and apart from
whatever moral obligations it might have generated. And I did not suggest
that, from the second sign's point of view, you were morally forbidden to
smoke, whether or not the sign actually imposed such a moral prohibition. Yet
the accounts I gave of these situations do not seem impoverished for my failure
to invoke this conceptual machinery. Indeed, it is hard to see how the notion of
a "rental house" obligation, or the suggestion that a sign has a point of view,
would shed any light on the situation. There is a sign that says you should
leave your cares at the door; it does not give you any reason to do so. If instead
the sign said "No smoking," it would give you several reasons to avoid smok-
ing, and perhaps an obligation as well. That is all there is to it, and we do not
36. I mean that the owner may have this right simply as a matter of morality, quite apart ftom
the operation of any legal system. If you're having difficulty with this example because you
think that ownership is a purely legal concept, you should spend some time with my tod-
dler, who knows nothing about law, but has strong views about what's his. In the mean-
time, you could swap out the sign for a note placed on the door by a neighbor.
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need to invoke any special kind of normativity, or quasi-normativity, unique to
the rental house or its signage, in order to make sense of these situations.
Let's complicate the story to see if anything changes. Suppose that when
you enter the rental house, you see a list tacked to the wall, labeled "Rules of
the House." It reads:
1. No smoking.
2. Take the trash out when you leave.
3. Do not use the garbage disposal; it doesn't work.
4. Check-out is 11:oo AM. If you stay longer, you will be charged for
an additional night's stay.
5. Have fun!
What are the normative upshots of the Rules of the House?" The fifth rule
is similar to the sign telling you to leave your cares at the door. It might put
you in mind to have fun, but it has no bearing on whether you should. In con-
trast, the first four rules seem to have both prudential and moral upshots. The
fact that the owner took the time to write out the rules suggests that she cares
about whether you do as they direct, and all four reflect matters about which
the owner has standing to make demands. The second rule is interesting; it in-
structs you to take the trash out when you leave, but it seems likely that the ob-
ligation this rule generates is to take the trash out by the time you leave, not
when you leave. This is because it is hard to see any purpose to taking out the
trash when you leave, so long as you do it beforehand and do not generate any
trash after you do. Though the owner of the house presumably has standing to
37. We use the word "rule" in different ways. Sometimes, we use "rule" to refer to a certain sort
of text. I can ask, for example, if you have a copy of the rules, or if you have gotten a chance
to read them yet. At other times, we use "rule" to refer to a certain sort of norm or standard
by which we can assess behavior. Rules in the first sense express rules in the latter sense,
though the relationship between them is complicated, for several reasons. First, a rule (read:
text) might be ambiguous, so that it fails to express a single rule (read: norm). Second, a
rule (read: norm) might be expressed through different texts. And third, a written rule
(read: text) might have many different rules (read: norms) associated with it. These might
include: the norm that is expressed by the text; the norm that the author of the text intend-
ed to express; and the norm that the author of the text intended to impose on others by
writing the text, among many other possibilities. In this Part, when I refer to the Rules of
the House in my own voice (or to the particular rules that appear in that list), I am referring
to the text posted on the wall, not any of the norms that might be associated with it. How-
ever, I will sometimes imagine characters talking about the Rules of the House in ways that
make clear that they are referring to norms that they take the posting of that text to have
made binding on themselves or others. It is important to remember that these characters
may or may not be right about the normative consequences of the posting of that text; it
may have had no normative consequences, or different normative consequences than they
take it to have had.
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demand that you take out the trash, the question whether you do it as you leave
or a bit before does not seem to affect her interests, so it would be odd to at-
tribute to her a right to determine the timing.
Or so it seems to me. But the interesting question is not whether I have all
this right; it is whether something is missing on account of my failure to look
for normative upshots of the Rules of the House that are neither moral nor
prudential. Once again, it is hard to see how positing a special sort of norma-
tivity, or even quasi-normativity, unique to the Rules of the House would shed
any light on the situation. So let's complicate the story again. Suppose now
that the rules tacked on the wall are preceded by the following statement: "The
property manager is authorized to enforce the Rules of the House by adding
appropriate charges to your bill." This is the first we have heard of the property
manager. If he has been lurking in the background all along, we might have
thought him authorized to add appropriate charges to the bill even without this
statement. But if we would have had any doubt about the role of the property
manager, this helps clarify matters. It indicates that the owner of the house has
delegated authority to impose additional charges to the property manager, and
it is hard to see anything wrong with that, at least on the facts we have.
Exactly what charges the property manager may tack on is a tricky matter.
If you smoke or attempt to run the garbage disposal, it would seem appropriate
to charge you the cost of repairing any damage caused. A modest fee would
likely be in order if you fail to take out the trash. The fourth rule specifies that
if you overstay the rental period you will be charged for an additional night.
That does not seem an egregious penalty, and the rule puts you on notice of it,
so it is plausible that the property manager is permitted to charge you the sum
specified, subject perhaps to a de minimis exception if you run just a few
minutes over. Of course, the property manager may not penalize your failure to
have fun, regardless of what the rules say.
What if the property manager adds an additional charge to your bill, but
not for misconduct mentioned in the Rules of the House? Does that imply that
he has done something impermissible, on account of the fact that his mandate
is limited to enforcing the Rules of the House? No, probably not. If you
knocked over a vase and the charge is to repair or replace it, it would be obtuse
to object that knocking over vases was not against the Rules of the House. The
property manager would presumably be permitted to impose remedial charges
of this sort in absence of the statement that he is authorized to enforce the
Rules of the House,18 and it is not tempting to apply the maxim expressio unius
est exclusio alterius here.
38. Subject, of course, to normal defenses (for instance, that the vase was negligently placed).
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Now we have an official, of sorts, charged with enforcing the Rules of the
House. And we are starting to engage the sorts of arguments that occupy law-
yers. We've asked whether notice is required before a penalty may be imposed;
whether a rule is subject to a de minimis exception; and whether explicit au-
thorization to engage in some acts implies a lack of authorization to engage in
others. But yet again, it seems we can describe and assess this situation just fine
without imagining that there is a distinct domain of normativity, or quasi-
normativity, created by the rules of the rental house. And it is hard to see what
benefit we'd get from invoking those notions.
But let's give it another try. Suppose you check out a few minutes late and
the property manager says, "Look, I don't think this is fair, but I'm obligated to
charge you an additional night's rent. Those are the rules of the house." Is the
property manager telling you that he has a non-moral "rental house" obligation
to charge you an additional night's rent? I find it difficult to imagine that he is,
as there are much more plausible ways to hear what he says. To start, the prop-
erty manager might think that he is morally obligated to do something he re-
gards as unfair. He might think that the owner of the house has the right to set
the charge and the conditions for imposing it. That is, he might see himself as
more or less a bookkeeper in the matter. If this is the property manager's view,
he might add, "I'm sorry. I'm just doing my job."
Another possibility is that the property manager means to communicate
that he is obliged to add the charge, not obligated to do it. That is, he might be
trying to say that he is adding the charge to the bill because he does not want to
risk reproach from the owner for failing to do so. If this is the property manag-
er's view, he might add, "I'm sorry. I need to keep my job." Ever since Hart's
devastating critique of Austin, philosophers of law have guarded a distinction
between being obligated and obliged, and helpfully so. However, there is no
reason to think that property managers are punctilious about the philosophers'
distinction, which does not seem to have filtered into common usage.39
Of course, the facts we've imagined are rather thin, so I can't say for sure
how we should take what the property manager says. But I do know this: the
property manager can navigate the situation that he's in without supposing
that the Rules of the House give rise to their own distinct domain of norma-
tivity, or that they have a point of view on how he should behave. And because
he has no need for those notions, it would be odd for us to employ them when
we interpret his claim that he's obligated to charge an additional night's rent.
39. The first definition of "obligate" in the OED is: "To bind (a person) morally; to put (a per-
son) under moral obligation; to constrain, compel, oblige." Obligate Definition, OXFoRD
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But we can try one more time, flipping this last example around. Suppose
again that you check out late and that the property manager tells you that he's
obligated to charge you an additional night's rent. This time, however, he adds
that he's not going to impose that charge because he thinks it unfair. Is the
property manager invoking a special sort of normativity, unique to the rental
house? Once again, I'm skeptical, since there are much more plausible ways to
hear what he says. As before, the property manager might think that, given his
role, he is obligated to do what the owner of the house has instructed him to
do, whether or not he thinks it fair. If he's right, then in refusing to impose the
charge, he's failing to live up to the responsibility of the role. That may be un-
warranted, but it's a failing that is easy to understand, as people all the time
feel conflicts between the roles they occupy and the decisions they would make
if freed from the constraints of the role. But of course, there's another way to
make sense of what the property manager says. In referring to his obligation to
impose the charge, he might just mean to indicate that he feels compelled to do
so, even though he plans to resist. Of course, we'd need to know more about
the situation to know how best to interpret the property manager. But once
again, the property manager can navigate the situation without supposing that
the Rules of the House generate a special sort of normativity, or even quasi-
normativity, and because he can, we can, too.
We could go on, making these examples ever more complicated and law-
like. But that would get tedious, and we have no reason to think anything
would change. At every step, there would be moral and prudential upshots to
the social facts that constitute the situation. However, there is no reason to
think that we would arrive at a point where we would have to posit a distinc-
tive class of non-moral "rental house" obligations to make sense of the situa-
tion. There is no reason to think that we would have to attribute a point of
view to a sign or a set of rules. And that should give us pause. If we don't need
recourse to these ideas to understand the ways that people engage the rules
posted in a rental house, maybe we don't need to appeal to them to understand
the ways that people engage law.
V. PROMISES
But that's getting ahead of ourselves. Before we turn to law, we should see
if we can extend the lesson learned from the rental house cases to other norma-
tive practices. We can start with promises, which are one of the most common
tools we use to shape the norms that govern our lives. Once again, we can work
through a series of cases to see if we generate the problems that preoccupy phi-
losophers of law.
Suppose that I promise that I will drive you to the grocery store at noon
tomorrow. Before the promise, I wasn't obligated to do so. After the promise, I
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am obligated, and that's just what I intended. That's straightforward enough,
but now suppose that the time has arrived and your needs have changed. You
don't need to go to the grocery store, you need to go to the doctor, as you are
worried about a sudden shift in your vision. Am I obligated to take you? We
might want to know more. (How far away is the doctor's office? Could you get
another ride? How long would that take?) But I am inclined to think that I am
obligated to take you. Certainly, I would think so if the time commitment were
similar to the commitment I'd already made when I promised you a ride to the
grocery store. And given the urgency of the situation, I would probably think
so even if it were not. Moreover, if I am obligated to drive you to the doctor,
it's plausible that this obligation is a consequence of my promise to drive you
to the grocery store. Had I not made that promise, you might not have had a
claim on my time.4" If that is right, then this is a case in which my promise ob-
ligates me to do something that is not what I promised to do, which is an indi-
cation that we are not fully in control of the moral significance of our promises.
Now, imagine that I promise that I'll murder your cousin. Before the
promise, I wasn't obligated to do so. After the promise, I'm still not obligated,
as one can't obligate oneself to commit murder. Of course, you and I might not
recognize that. We might be mobsters, who think that a person who gives his
word is bound to do what he said he would, even if it is evil. But that is one of
the many ways in which mobsters are morally misguided. A promise to murder
does not generate an obligation to murder. Indeed, if it generates any obliga-
tions at all, they are likely obligations to abandon the plot or foil it before it
comes to fruition.
Once again, the interesting question is not whether I have all this right. It is
whether anything is missing from the analysis on account of my failure to sup-
pose that a promise gives rise to a distinct domain of normativity, or even qua-
si-normativity, separate and apart from the moral and prudential consequences
that the promise might trigger. And once again, the answer is no. We wouldn't
gain anything by suggesting that, from the point of view of my first promise, I
am morally obligated to drive you to the grocery store. And we wouldn't make
any progress by supposing that my second promise generated a promissory ob-
ligation to murder your cousin, even though it did not trigger a moral obliga-
tion to do so. 41 So far as we are concerned, the promising cases look just like
40. Of course, our relationship might be such that I am obligated to drop what I'm doing and
drive you to the doctor, promise or not. In that case, my obligation to drive you to the doc-
tor would not be a consequence of my promise.
41. Of course, we do sometimes speak of promissory obligations. But promissory obligations
are just a species of moral obligations. See Allen Habib, Promises, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/promises [http://perma.cc/58F7-7MSJ] (distin-
guishing promissory obligations from "other sorts of moral obligations"). The word "prom-
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the rental house cases. Once we set out the social facts and run through the
moral and prudential consequences of those facts, there's nothing left to do.
We don't need to look for additional normative, or quasi-normative, conse-
quences of the promises.
And though we have only considered a handful of cases so far, it is starting
to look like there is a general lesson to draw here. When we post rules or make
promises, we are aiming to shape the norms that govern our lives. But we do
not shape those norms by creating, out of whole cloth, new sorts of normativi-
ty, or even quasi-normativity, unique to those activities. Rather, we shape
those norms by shifting the social facts in ways that have moral or prudential
consequences. If law is continuous with practices like posting rules and making
promises, we might expect that legal practices shape the norms that govern our
lives in the same way.' That is, we might expect that legal practices shape the
norms that govern our lives by shifting social facts in ways that have moral and
prudential consequences, not by creating, out of whole cloth, a new sort of
normativity, or even quasi-normativity, unique to legal practice.
VI. PLAYING GAMES
Is law continuous with practices like posting rules and making promises?
Here is a difference that might seem to matter: the normative practices we have
examined so far aimed to subject people to isolated norms or small sets of
loosely related ones. Legal practices, however, aim to subject people to large
sets of norms that bear systematic relations to one another. Now we should be
careful not to make too much of this difference, for you can promise to abide
by a system of norms. You might, for example, promise to follow the tenets of
Orthodox Judaism. But there is still a difference here, as those tenets are not
established by that promise; at best, the promise establishes the isolated norm
that you should adhere to those tenets. Our legal practices are much more am-
bitious than this. Taken together, they aim to subject people to systems of
norms, and, indeed, systems that regulate our lives rather pervasively. And we
might wonder whether the fact that legal practices aim to subject people to sys-
tems of norms gives us reason to think they generate their own distinct domain
of normativity.
issory" marks the source of obligations that arise from promises. It does not signal that there
is a distinct domain of normativity, or even quasi-normativity, generated by promises,
without regard to their moral consequences. See infra text accompanying note 51.
42. Jeremy Waldron traces the analogy between promises and law in more depth in Waldron,
supra note 3.
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Of course, legal practices are not the only sorts of activities that aim to sub-
ject people to systems of norms. The practices that constitute games do as well.
And it is worth thinking about games in some detail, since philosophers often
point to games as analogues for thinking about law. We can work with chess,
which in its most organized form is strikingly law-like. It has a governing
body - the World Chess Federation (FIDE) - that publishes official rules (actu-
ally, they are called "laws"), arranges tournaments, qualifies arbiters, and
maintains rankings. All those actions plausibly have normative consequences.
That is, they plausibly affect what people have reason to do- morally, pruden-
tially, or (since we are dealing with a game) simply for purposes of having fun,
or an opportunity to manifest the kinds of excellence that games like chess
make possible. But now we might wonder: separate from these sorts of norma-
tive consequences, do the FIDE rules generate a distinct domain of normativi-
ty, or quasi-normativity, such that there are FIDE reasons or obligations that
are not also reasons or obligations of other sorts?43
Once again, it will help to work with an example, so let's try this. Imagine
that you are in the midst of a game of chess when you absentmindedly pick up
a pawn with your left hand and put it back on the board with your right. Your
opponent objects. You look confused, and she explains that FIDE's rules pro-
vide that a move must be made with one hand only. She's right about that; in
the midst of a lengthy section that addresses nearly every question that might
arise about the act of moving pieces on a chessboard, the rules say that "[e]ach
move must be made with one hand only."' Other rules in that section provide
that a player must announce his intention before adjusting any piece he does
not plan to move; 45 move the first piece he deliberately touches if it is one of his
own;, 6 and castle if he deliberately touches his king and rook, and it is possible
for him to do so. 47 These rules, and several more that surround them, are close-
ly related to one another. There would be little point in having just one or two
of them. But, taken together, they help ensure that a player cannot judge his
opponent's reaction to a move before completing it. And they provide clarity
about when a player is committed to a move, such that he is not permitted to
second-guess it. So when your opponent objects that you switched hands mid-
43. Once again, when I refer to the FIDE rules, I am referring to a text that FIDE has published,
not to any of the many norms that might be associated with that text. See supra note 37.
44. Laws of Chess, FIDE § 4.1 (Nov. 2008), http://www.fide.com/component/handbook/?id=1z4
&view=article [http://perma.cc/S77J-sBEF].
45. Id. S4.2.
46. Id. § 4.3a.
47. Id. § 4.4a.
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move, she is complaining that you flouted a finely wrought system of rules that
improve play of the game.
But did you really flout the rules? To answer, we need to know more about
the context of the game. After all, the mere fact that FIDE has published rules
for playing chess does not in itself affect what anyone playing chess ought to
do. To be sure, the FIDE rules are rules that one could follow to play a game of
chess. But they are not the only such rules, and until we know more about the
context of the match, we cannot say whether FIDE's rules have any normative
consequences for you. For all we know, the FIDE rules might be just like the
sign that said, "Leave your cares at the door." They might not bear at all on the
question what you should do.
Of course, it is easy to imagine circumstances in which the FIDE rules do
have normative consequences for you. If you're playing in a FIDE-sanctioned
tournament, for example, then you are presumably obligated to follow the
rules, and, if you fail to do so, you are subject to the appropriate sanction. This
obligation owes in part to FIDE's promulgation of the rules, but also to your
decision to participate, knowing that those rules had been selected to govern
the tournament. The picture looks rather different if you are playing a casual
game with a friend. Unless you hang out with folks who are very serious about
chess, it's hard to imagine that switching hands mid-move is wrong regardless
of what the FIDE rules say. If your friend objects, you'll push back, reminding
her that you are playing a casual game, which is not governed by arcane rules.
If she insists that you did not do what the rule requires, you might retort that
that rule did not require anything of you at all.
We need to pick apart this dispute carefully. There's a sense in which your
friend is right to say that you did not do what the FIDE rule requires. You
didn't do what the rule requires in the sense that you didn't satisfy the stand-
ard specified in the text. But, of course, that doesn't count as an objection if
you had no reason to satisfy that standard. In other words, it is open to you to
maintain that FIDE's adoption of a rule requiring players to make moves with
one hand only has no normative consequences for people engaged in a casual
game of chess. And if you pressed that claim, I'd think you were right. A casual
game of chess seems more apt to be governed by the widely known rules of
chess than it does by FIDE's more complete set of rules, absent an antecedent
agreement about what rules are in play. I said before that the FIDE rules im-
prove play of the game, but that will only be true when the point of playing is
to match wits in the fashion that the rules facilitate. If the point is simply to
have fun, then appeals to the FIDE rules will almost certainly get in the way.
But once again the question is not whether I have all this right. The ques-
tion is whether something is missing from my analysis on account of my failure
to look for non-moral FIDE obligations to play the way the rules say. And once
again, the answer is no. FIDE adopted a rule that says chess players must make
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each move with one hand only. That rule is part of a system that improves play
of the game, at least for some purposes. When you choose to play in a FIDE-
sanctioned chess tournament, you are obligated to follow it. But when you play
a casual game of chess, you are not. As we have seen repeatedly, we can navi-
gate these situations just fine without supposing that the FIDE rules give rise
to a non-moral FIDE obligation to make each move with one hand only, or that
the FIDE rules have a point of view on how players should handle chess pieces.
That is, we can navigate these situations just fine without supposing that the
FIDE rules give rise to their own distinct domain of normativity, or even quasi-
normativity.
But I want to drill down a bit further here. When FIDE adopted its rules, it
did not generate a new sort of normativity. FIDE's rules govern people's be-
havior only to the extent they have reasons to follow them. But in some cir-
cumstances, we might want to bracket the question whether people have such
reasons and ask the narrower question how they should behave if they do. We
might, for example, want to envision how a chess match would go if it were
governed by the FIDE rules, without supposing that the FIDE rules are in fact
the rules that govern. There is no question that we can do this sort of thing,
and we often do. And so we might think that there is a kind of quasi-
normativity associated with the FIDE rules. Indeed, we might even go so far as
to say that the FIDE rules have a point of view as to how people should play
chess: they should play chess according to the standards specified in the rules.
No doubt, we can speak this way. The point I have been trying to make is
that we don't need to speak this way, and typically we don't. But we shouldn't
avoid this sort of talk just because it is superfluous. We should avoid it because
it risks a great deal of confusion, and I want here to explain why. The FIDE
rules don't exist in a vacuum. They have a history, and it is only in light of their
history that anyone has any reason to care about them. The central fact in their
history is, of course, that they were adopted by FIDE. When you couple that
fact with some others, it may turn out that a particular chess match is governed
by the standards expressed in the FIDE rules. As I said before, this seems apt to
be the case when the chess match is part of a FIDE tournament, which the
players chose to participate in.
But even in those circumstances, it is possible that play is not governed by
the standards expressed in the FIDE rules. Instead, play may be governed by
the standards that FIDE intended to adopt, which may or may not have been
fully or accurately captured in the text that its officials had in front of them
when they voted. Or it may be that play is governed by the standards that
would best serve the purposes that FIDE had when it adopted the text, even if
those standards are slightly different than the standards reflected in the text.
Or it may be that some combination of these things is true, depending on the
phase of play or the context of the match. This should all feel familiar, as these
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possibilities are also at play in debates over statutory interpretation. And here,
just as there, the question which standards govern is a question about the nor-
mative significance of a set of social facts. The question is whether the act of
adopting the rules subjected people to the standards expressed in the text of the
rules adopted or to some other set of standards, differently connected to that
event.
48
Of course, there is no reason to think that the answer to this question will
always be the same. Most lawyers (but by no means all) are open to the possi-
bility that an act of legislation subjects people to standards that might not be
fully or accurately captured in the relevant statute. With games, there might be
reason to take the opposite view, as participants may have only the text of the
rules available to them, with no further indicia of the intentions that lay behind
the endorsement of that text. But one doesn't have to search far for instances in
which people contend that the rules governing a game are not quite the rules
expressed in the text that purports to provide the official rules of the game.49
48. Cf. Greenberg, Legislation as Communication?, supra note 2, at 217 (making a similar point
about law).
49. Consider, for example, baseball's famous Pine Tar Incident. George Brett came to bat for the
Kansas City Royals, who trailed the New York Yankees by one run in the top of the ninth.
One man was on and two men were out. Brett hit a home run to give the Royals the lead.
But the umpires declared Brett out and the game over when the Yankees manager protested
that the pine tar on Brett's bat-applied to improve the grip-extended farther than the
rules allowed. Lee MacPhail, then the President of the American League, reversed the um-
pires' call when the Royals protested. He allowed that the umpires' interpretation of the rule
was "technically defensible" but went on to conclude that it was not consistent with the
"intent or the spirit of the rules" for a batter to be called out for using excessive
pine tar. Text of League President's Ruling in Brett Bat Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1983,
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/o7/29/sports/text-of-league-president-s-ruling-in-brett-bat
-case.html [http://perma.cc/Qp4E-EPCN]. Moreover, MacPhail added, it was important
for games to "be won and lost on the playing field" and not decided by "technicalities of the
rules." Id. In other words, MacPhail decided that the standard expressed in the text of the
official rules was not the standard that governed.
Chess has its own examples. The final match of the 20o8 U.S. Women's Chess Cham-
pionship pitted Irina Krush against Anna Zitonskih. Zitonskih won in a tiebreaker. Krush
protested that Zitonskih had illegally started her moves before Krush had completed her
own; if true, that would have given her an advantage, since the tiebreaker involved a form of
speed chess. Thus, Krush argued, the result of the match should be set aside. See Open Let-
ter from Irina Krush to Chess Life Online (May 30, 20o8), http://www.uschess.org/content
/view/8475/429 [http://perma.cc/Y4MH-2HN 5]. In response to those who contended that
Zitonskih's conduct was acceptable under the FIDE rules, Krush argued that the details of
the FIDE rules were beside the point. She wrote: "The reality is, chess players prepare for
tournaments by studying the Sicilian, not by updating themselves on the latest wrinkles in
the USCF/FIDE handbook. Thus, I sat down to play the final game intending to follow the
only rules I know well-'chess' rules. These are the rules I have learned from watching how
people behave at chess tournaments over my eighteen years of playing, and these are the
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I don't want to chase further examples down the rabbit hole. But I do want
to say this. We started with the thought that we could bracket the question
whether anyone has reason to pay attention to the FIDE rules, so that we could
focus on the narrower question how they should behave if they do. The prob-
lem with that way of proceeding is that the reasons people have to pay atten-
tion to the FIDE rules affect the standards that govern their behavior. If we say
that the standards expressed in the FIDE rules constitute FIDE's point of view
as to how chess should be played, we run the risk of missing the possibility
that, in adopting those rules, FIDE actually subjected people to standards other
than the ones the text expresses. So not only is it superfluous to say that FIDE's
rules have a point of view as to how chess should be played, it might also be
misleading as to the normative consequences of the adoption of those rules.
We'd do better to ask about the normative consequences directly, rather than
to imagine into being a point of view that might or might not bear on what
people should do. So the point is not only that we can navigate the situations
imagined just fine without supposing that the FIDE rules generate a distinctive
sort of quasi-normativity, but that we should.
VII. CAN WE LEAVE THE FLY-BOTTLE?
Enough with the law-like practices. The time has come to see if we can find
our way out of the fly-bottle. As I said at the start, the Hart-Dworkin debate is
premised on the idea that legal practices give rise to distinctively legal rights,
obligations, privileges, and powers, which can and often do differ from their
moral counterparts. The debate is over how this distinctively legal domain of
normativity, or quasi-normativity, is constituted. But if we have drawn the
right lessons from the normative practices we've examined so far, then we
should be skeptical that law generates a distinctively legal domain of norma-
tivity, or even quasi-normativity. The problem is that it sure looks like law
does. After all, we talk about our legal obligations; distinguish them from our
moral obligations; and recognize that the two can conflict, sometimes in terri-
ble ways. All that would seem to imply that our legal practices generate a dis-
rules I instinctively adhere to using my own common sense and judgment. FIDE or USCF
rules might need to be referred to once in a while, but for the most part, people do just fine
relying on 'chess' rules." Final Letter from Irina Krush to Chess Life Online (June ii, 2oo8),
http://www.uschess.org/content/view/8486/463 [http://perma.cc/4Z5 4-7MK7]. And she
concluded: "My appeal was always to fairness and to the spirit of chess competition rather
than to the minutiae of legal handbooks, and that's why I won't be taking up the reader's
time with my interpretation of FIDE rule 6.8 A." Id. Krush's protest was less successful than
Brett's, but implicit in both was the possibility that the rules governing a game are not simp-
ly the rules that are expressed in the text that purports to provide the official rules.
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tinctively legal domain of normativity, or at least quasi-normativity. Unless, of
course, there are other explanations for our inclination to talk that way.
I think there are other explanations, and my plan for this Part is to suggest
several. But let me say up front that I don't think these are the only explana-
tions; I single them out because they strike me as relatively important ones.
Let's start by assuming that our legal practices are continuous with the norma-
tive practices we've examined so far, in that they do not generate their own dis-
tinctive domain of normativity, or even quasi-normativity. What I hope to
show is that even if that is true, we would still have good reasons to talk about
our legal obligations; distinguish them from our moral obligations; and recog-
nize that the two can conflict, sometimes in terrible ways. If I am right about
that, then the main reason we have for thinking that there is a distinctively le-
gal domain of normativity, or quasi-normativity, will be seriously weakened, if
not entirely vitiated.
Let's take it from the top. Why would we talk about legal obligations if
there is no distinctively legal domain of normativity or quasi-normativity?
Well, nearly no one doubts that our legal practices can and often do generate
moral obligations.5 0 Moreover, the moral obligations that our legal practices
generate are, in an important sense, legal obligations. This is because they are
obligations that we would not have but for our legal practices. We mark moral
obligations by their source all the time. If you are going to miss a friend's party
to take care of your grandmother, you might explain your absence by saying
that you have a family obligation. When you do that, you are not suggesting
that your family has its own distinct domain of normativity, or quasi-
normativity, associated with it. Rather, you are saying that you have an obliga-
tion of the ordinary moral sort, which arises in the context of your family.
We do the same with obligations that arise from promises. We call them
promissory obligations, not because we are suggesting that promises generate a
distinctive domain of normativity, but because we are signaling the source of
the obligations in question. Since it's often helpful to mark the sources of our
obligations, there's every reason to think we'd do the same with law. Which of
our moral obligations would we mark as legal? Well, if we were trying to signal
the source, the first criteria would surely be that the obligation was generated
by our legal practices. But the case of promissory obligations suggests that we
might label a narrower class of obligations "legal." After all, we don't label all
the obligations that promises generate "promissory obligations." To use our
earlier example, if I promise to murder your cousin, you might be obligated to
50. I suspect the only exceptions here are those who doubt that there are such things as moral
obligations, for if you think there are, it would be odd to hold the view that legal practices
could never generate them.
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turn me in. That's an obligation generated by my promise, but we wouldn't
call it a promissory obligation. Rather, we seem to restrict that label to those
obligations that are generated in the way that the practice characteristically
generates obligations; in the case of promising, we tend to restrict the label
"promissory" to obligations to do as one promised to do. We might expect
then that we would reserve the label "legal" for moral obligations that were
generated in ways that legal practice characteristically generates obligations. As
with promises, we'd expect that obligations to foil or frustrate morally iniqui-
tous laws would not count as legal.5 ' But an obligation to drive no faster than
the speed limit probably would. I won't take up the task of drawing this
boundary more precisely, because it's not obvious that anything turns on how
it's drawn, and we might draw it in different ways for different purposes. For
example, instead of using the label "legal" to signal the source of an obligation,
we might sometimes want to use it to signal the sort of institutions that might
call us to account for violating it. That means that we might tack the label "le-
gal" on different obligations at different times, depending on what we are try-
ing to communicate. Still, the general point remains: even if there were no dis-
tinctively legal obligations, we would nevertheless have good reason to regard
some of our obligations as legal.
But would we have any reason to distinguish our legal obligations from our
moral obligations? It might not seem like we would, as legal obligations are, on
this picture, just a species of moral obligations. But that is not quite right, as it
might well be helpful to distinguish moral obligations that are legal from moral
obligations that are merely moral. An illustration might help here. Suppose we
think that you are morally obligated to contribute your fair share to community
efforts to support the poor. Now, suppose that the legislature in your state has
adopted a special tax, with the plan that the funds raised will be spent on pov-
erty relief. As it happens, the tax demands too little of people as wealthy as you,
with the end result that the poverty programs will not be adequately funded.
My guess is that we'd think you were morally obligated to pay the tax. You
are, after all, obligated to contribute to the sorts of programs that the revenue
raised will fund, and this kind of coordinated effort is probably far more effec-
tive than any action you could take on your own. Moreover, this moral obliga-
s. The approach suggested in this paragraph is similar to the approach suggested in Green-
berg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, supra note 2. Greenberg argues that legal obligations
are the moral obligations brought about by the actions of legal institutions in legally proper
ways. And he offers a preliminary account of what counts as legally proper, which would ex-
clude obligations to frustrate or mitigate morally iniquitous laws. Id. at 1321-23. I think this
is fine as far as it goes, but as I discuss below, I doubt that Greenberg's formula fully cap-
tures the domain of the legal, in part because I think the boundaries of that domain shift
with the purposes we have in drawing it.
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tion would be a legal obligation, in the sense just explained, as its source would
lie in legal practice. But your legal obligation to pay the tax would not com-
pletely displace your moral obligation to contribute your fair share in support
of the poor, since, by hypothesis, the law demands only part of your fair share.
That means there's a moral remainder: you have a moral obligation to do more
in aid of the poor than the law requires. Now, it's possible that the existence of
this moral remainder is a reason to increase the tax, but perhaps not. There are
sometimes good reasons for the law to demand less of people than they are
morally required to do. But we need not worry about that here. The point for
now is that we can say all this and more without even once supposing that
there is a distinctively legal domain of normativity, or even quasi-normativity,
to which our talk of legal obligations refers.
My suspicion is that we can handle many of the distinctions we draw be-
tween our legal obligations and moral obligations in the fashion just suggest-
ed. 2 But that still leaves the hard cases. We don't just distinguish legal and
moral obligations; we sometimes say that they conflict, and worse yet, we
sometimes say people have a legal obligation to do things that are morally re-
pugnant. Would we talk that way if legal practices did not generate a distinc-
tively legal domain of normativity, or at least quasi-normativity? I think that
we would. The ordinary cases of conflict aren't so hard, as our moral obliga-
tions conflict with one another all the time. Suppose that I have promised my
son that I will take him to the movies on Saturday afternoon, but, when the
time arrives, my mother is ill and I am the only person available to take her to
the doctor. Here, I have an obligation to take my son to the movies and an ob-
ligation to take my mother to the doctor. The second would surely take priority
over the first, but both obligations would be genuine, and I would need to
apologize to my son for missing the movie and make it up to him at some fu-
ture date. These sorts of conflicts are routine, and there is no reason to doubt
that our legal practices generate them. That is, there is no reason to doubt that
moral obligations whose source lies in legal practice sometimes conflict with
moral obligations whose source lies elsewhere.
52. What of the opposite case, in which the tax demands more than people have an antecedent
obligation to pay in support of the poor? In many such cases, I expect we would still think it
morally obligatory to pay the tax. The communal commitment reflected in the law might
turn something that is morally optional into something morally obligatory, in much the way
that promises often do. And when this happens, the moral obligation to pay the tax will be a
legal obligation, both in the sense that its source lies in legal practice and in the sense that
legal institutions might call you to account for violating it. In the rare case where the task is
so confiscatory as to be morally prohibited, we should conclude that there is no moral obli-
gation to pay the tax and hence no legal obligation either. But for the reasons I explain be-
low, it may nevertheless be appropriate for us to talk and act as if there is a legal obligation
to pay the tax.
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That all seems straightforward enough. The tricky cases are the ones in
which it looks like we have a legal obligation to do something morally repug-
nant. If there are genuine legal obligations to do things that people could not
possibly have a moral obligation to do, then we are stuck in the fly-bottle, as
that would imply that there is a class of distinctively legal obligations whose
metaphysics we need to untangle. But I don't think the fact that we sometimes
talk as if there are such cases demands that we conclude that there is a distinc-
tively legal domain of normativity, or even quasi-normativity. As it turns out,
there would be good reason to talk that way even if there were not, though it
will take a bit of effort to explain why.
In our everyday lives, we use a set of heuristics, or working theories, to
identify our moral obligations. For example, we tell ourselves that we are obli-
gated to keep our promises, and that's a helpful guide to our responsibilities,
even though a moment's reflection reveals it as an obvious oversimplification.
The same is true with law. We have a working theory about how our legal
practices generate legal obligations. We don't agree on all the particulars, and
there are marginal cases we aren't sure about. But we have enough of a work-
ing theory to recognize when our legal practices have generated an obligation,
without much investigation into the particulars. Around here, for example, we
tend to think judges are obligated to enforce duly enacted statutes. Of course,
there are exceptions; judges shouldn't enforce statutes that are unconstitution-
al, and there may be justiciability concerns that warrant declining to enforce
particular statutes in particular cases. But in the main, when we see that a stat-
ute has been duly enacted, we move quite quickly to the judgment that it
would be wrong for a judge to ignore it. From time to time, however, facts
arise that confound our working theory. Sometimes, the legislature passes a
statute that is so morally repugnant that no judge ought to enforce it.
Now you might think that confronting cases like this, or even just antici-
pating them, should lead us to qualify our working theory. Instead of holding
that judges are legally obligated to enforce duly enacted statutes, we should
hold that judges are obligated to enforce duly enacted statutes unless they are
morally repugnant. But there are reasons to resist qualifying our working theo-
ry that way. To start, if judges take themselves to be free to ignore morally re-
pugnant statutes, then they might abuse that freedom. They might ignore stat-
utes that are merely morally misguided, but not so morally repugnant that they
ought not to be enforced. Or worse yet, they might ignore statutes they simply
dislike. Another reason is that we might not want to cultivate in our judges the
sense that they sit as moral arbiters of what the legislature has done. 3 The up-
53. If the picture I am proposing is right, then judges do need to work out some of the moral
consequences of what the legislature has done-in particular, they need to decide how the
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shot is that even if we think there are statutes that are so morally repugnant
they ought not to be enforced, we may not want to frame the moral responsi-
bilities of judges that way. And so our working theory may sometimes suggest
that a judge has a legal obligation to enforce a statute that is so morally repug-
nant that it ought not to be enforced. Because there is a gap between our work-
ing theory of the role of a judge and our case-by-case judgment as to what stat-
utes should be enforced, we are apt to say that a judge has a legal obligation to
do something that, considered on the merits, she morally ought not to do. But
there are good reasons to construe the role of a judge that way.
I'll illustrate this more concretely in a moment. But I want first to draw an
analogy, which might sharpen our sense of the moral phenomenon that I'm
trying to capture. As a parent, I regard myself as obligated to love and support
my children. If I step outside my role, and think about things in a clearheaded
fashion - or maybe if I just think about some other parent and her kids - then
of course I recognize that there are limits to that obligation. Some people are
moral monsters, who are not proper objects of love. And some people pursue
projects so repugnant that they do not deserve support of any sort, not even
from their parents. But when I step back into my role as parent, it would be a
serious mistake to frame my obligation to love and support my children in a
more qualified fashion. It would be a mistake for me to say to myself, "I will
love and support these children so long as they are not morally repugnant."
And it would be an even worse mistake to say something like that to them. My
children ought to think that my love and support is unconditional, even if, in
the final analysis, it is not. And I should not even entertain the thought that my
children might trigger the conditions under which I should and would with-
draw my love and support. The upshot is that I construe my role as parent to
impose moral obligations that I do not, strictly speaking, have. But there are
overwhelming moral reasons to do so, and we are all better off for it.
I think this phenomenon is at work in law too, though the reasons for re-
sisting the most accurate characterizations of people's obligations are different.
Let me circle back to the well-worn example of the Fugitive Slave Act to see if I
can show you what I mean. The Act was as repugnant as any statute could be,
and we might assume that no one could be under a moral obligation to do the
terrible things that it demanded. But it nevertheless strikes us as appropriate to
say that those subject to the Act had a legal obligation to do what it demanded.
And that makes it seem like legal obligations just could not be moral obliga-
tions. But I don't think that's right.
statute affects the rights of the parties appearing before them. But that is a task that can be
undertaken in different registers, and we might want them to approach it with humility and
deference to the judgment of an elected branch.
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Whatever its moral faults, the Fugitive Slave Act was a duly enacted statute,
and our working theory is that federal marshals are legally obligated to enforce
such statutes. Now from where we sit, we can plainly see that there was no
moral obligation to enforce this particular statute, which means that there
could not be a legal obligation to enforce it either, as we are supposing that le-
gal obligations just are moral obligations generated by legal practice. We could
respond to this conflict by revising our working theory about the role of federal
marshals to hold that they have an obligation to enforce duly enacted statutes
unless they are morally repugnant. But we have reasons to resist framing the
responsibilities of federal marshals that way. As before, we don't want federal
marshals to think of themselves as moral arbiters of the acts of Congress; we
want them to approach their jobs with humility and deference. But even more
than that, we want them to experience conflict when they come across a statute
they think they ought not to enforce. We'd like federal marshals to have the
thought that it is not their role to decide whether a statute should be enforced,
even if we also hope that they will recognize that there are occasions for step-
ping outside their role and declining to enforce a statute.
If I had to sum up the point I'm trying to make, I'd say this: we often have
reasons to be morally obtuse about our moral obligations. We should regard
ourselves as having a moral obligation to love and support our children uncon-
ditionally, even if, on cold reflection, we realize that no one could have such an
obligation. And we should sometimes regard ourselves as subject to legal obli-
gations to do things that we could not have a moral obligation to do, even
though legal obligation is a species of moral obligation. The upshot is that even
if our legal practices do not give rise to a distinctively legal domain of norma-
tivity, or quasi-normativity, there would nevertheless be good reason to see
ourselves as subject to legal obligations to do things that we morally ought not
to do.
Put all this together, and you can start to see a path out of the fly-bottle.
We've been trapped inside because it seemed that we had to posit a distinctive-
ly legal domain of normativity, or quasi-normativity, to make sense of the way
that we talk about law. But that's a mistake. Even if legal practices did not give
rise to a distinctively legal domain of normativity, or quasi-normativity, we
would still have good reason to talk about our legal obligations; distinguish
them from our moral obligations; and recognize that the two can conflict,
sometimes in terrible ways. That means that the case for thinking that there is
a distinctively legal domain of normativity, or quasi-normativity, cannot rest
on the way we talk about law.
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VIII. SHOULD WE LEAVE THE FLY-BOTTLE?
I cannot prove that there are no distinctively legal rights, obligations, privi-
leges, and powers. All I can do is invite you to try on that view and appreciate
its virtues. I want to highlight three here. First, if we deny that law generates a
distinctively legal domain of normativity, or quasi-normativity, then we can
represent law as continuous with the other normative practices we have exam-
ined, like posting rules and making promises. At the least, anyone who would
hold on to the idea that law generates its own distinctive domain of normativi-
ty, or quasi-normativity, must explain why law is different from these other
sorts of normative practices. And that will be difficult to do. As we saw with
the rental house cases, we can quite quickly generate complicated normative
practices that we do not take to give rise to their own distinctive domain of
normativity, or quasi-normativity. So complexity won't be the answer. And our
investigation of games taught us that the systematic nature of law won't be ei-
ther. It's hard to see what's left that might set law apart.
Second, the picture I am proposing is ontologically spare. Indeed, we might
think of it as a kind of eliminativism, since it denies the existence of an entity-
a distinctively legal domain of normativity, or quasi-normativity- that more
traditional pictures presuppose. s Moreover, the picture is spare in a welcome
54. Liam Murphy once raised the possibility of an eliminativist position more aggressive than
the one on offer here. See Liam Murphy, Better To See Law This Way, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
io88, 1104-o8 (2008). Murphy suggested that we might do away with what Dworkin called
the doctrinal concept of law, which is the concept in play when we make claims about what
the law "requires or prohibits or permits or creates." DWORKIN, supra note 34, at 2. Murphy
dismissed this sort of eliminativism on the ground that it would require too much revision
to our ordinary discourse. See Murphy, supra, at 1104-o8. He observed that it is important
that we be able to talk, for example, about what the law requires and what it does not, a dis-
tinction he thought we would lose if we cast the doctrinal concept of law overboard. Id.
Murphy is surely right to think that we need to be able to talk about what the law re-
quires, and I am not suggesting that we stop. What I want to eliminate is the idea that there
is a distinctively legal domain of normativity, or quasi-normativity, that we appeal to when
we make claims about what the law requires. On the picture I have presented, we can talk
about what the law requires; it's just that when we do, we are making moral or prudential
claims. We can also overcome the other worries Murphy raised about his eliminativist pro-
posal. For example, we can distinguish "between how a judge ought to reason when she
ought to give force to the law and how she ought to reason in those circumstances that justi-
fy not giving force to the law." Id. at 1107. We need only suppose that there are distinctive
moral responsibilities associated with some roles and also moral reasons for the people who
occupy those roles to step outside them on some occasions. Furthermore, we can account for
the fact that judges believe that their "first obligation" is to "figure out what the law is and
apply it." Id. at i1o6. In the normal case, we might think, morality directs that a judge iden-
tify the standards that her role requires her to apply, and only then ask whether there are
reasons to act outside the role.
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way. If we deny that legal practices give rise to a distinctively legal domain of
normativity, or quasi-normativity, we relieve ourselves of the burden of ex-
plaining just what that domain is and how its content is constituted."5 In other
words, we relieve ourselves of the burden of defending a position within the
Hart-Dworkin debate. Of course, that's not a sufficient reason to deny that law
generates distinctively legal rights, obligations, privileges, and powers. But it is
a welcome consequence of concluding so on other grounds.
Third, and perhaps most important, adopting the eliminativist view allows
us to take advantage of the best that positivism and anti-positivism have to of-
fer. Joseph Raz once pronounced Hart "the heir and torch-bearer of a great
tradition in the philosophy of law which is realist and unromantic in outlook"
on account of the fact that "it regards the existence and content of the law as a
matter of social fact whose connection with moral or any other values is con-
tingent and precarious. '' ,6 The eliminativist picture I have proposed is realist
and unromantic in much the same way.7 It allows that any particular law, or
legal system, might be wholly devoid of moral merit, or worse than that, mor-
ally repugnant. It is a picture from which we can endorse a version of the posi-
tivist slogan: "[T]he existence of the law is one thing, its moral merit and de-
merit quite another.", 8 And it is a picture that allows us to talk clearly about the
difference between the way our legal practices are and the way that they ought
to be.
What sets the eliminativist picture apart from positivism is its insistence
that the question what rights, obligations, privileges, and powers are generated
by our legal practices is a moral question. Of course, most positivists would
agree that, ultimately, the question what anyone -layperson, lawyer, or legal
official -ought to do in light of our legal practices is a moral question. 9 They
ss. David Enoch suggests that there is no important difference between saying (a) that legal
reasons are not real reasons and (b) that there are no legal reasons. See David Enoch, Rea-
son-Giving and the Law, in OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 16-19 (Leslie Green &
Brian Leiter eds., 2011). But there is an important difference here. When you say that legal
reasons are not real reasons, you owe us an account of what they are, since the claim is that
they are not what they purport to be. If instead you say that there are no legal reasons, then
you don't face that burden, though you might take on a different one -explaining why peo-
ple sometimes talk as if there were. So the choice between (a) and (b) is not, as Enoch sug-
gests, a choice between two different ways of saying the same thing.
56. RAz, supra note 32, at 194.
S7. It is not realist and romantic in just the same way, since it holds that our legal obligations
are moral obligations. But it is quite close, since it holds that the content of laws (as opposed
to the content of the law) is a matter of social fact.
58. SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at lo1; see also HART, supra note 9, at 210-1i.
59. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAz, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF LAW
AND PRACTICAL REASON ch. 7 (2009).
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simply insist that our legal practices generate distinctively legal rights, obliga-
tions, privileges, and powers separate from whatever moral rights, obligations,
privileges, and powers they generate. But that insistence is mysterious, for all
the reasons we have explored so far. And it is not necessary, as we can maintain
a realist and unromantic outlook toward law without it.
If positivism is at its best when it emphasizes that law is a social practice
with contingent moral merit, anti-positivism is at its best when it explains the
role that morality plays in that practice. People disagree about what the law re-
quires. But they think that the law imposes determinate requirements, not-
withstanding the fact that they disagree about what they are. In holding that
legal obligations are a species of moral obligation, the eliminativist position
vindicates Dworkin's suggestion that people disagree about what the law re-
quires because they disagree about the moral significance of our legal practices.
The only difference is that Dworkin took morality to play a part in determining
the content of distinctively legal rights, obligations, privileges, and powers,
whereas the eliminativist position denies that there is a distinctive domain of
legal normativity to be determined. But that difference does not affect the ex-
planation Dworkin gave of the role that morality plays in legal practice.
The path out of the fly-bottle should be attractive to positivists and anti-
positivists alike. It honors the core commitments of both, while avoiding the
troubles that plague the efforts to vindicate one over the other. We might not
have to leave the fly-bottle. But it is increasingly hard to see why we would
stay.
CONCLUSION: THE END OF JURISPRUDENCE
I promised some history-and a new end for jurisprudence, too. So let me
close with some thoughts about where jurisprudence has been and a suggestion
for where it ought to go. For a long time, jurisprudence has been about the
question posed in the Hart-Dworkin debate-not exclusively, of course, but
primarily. The premise of that debate is that our legal practices generate dis-
tinctively legal rights, obligations, privileges, and powers; the question at issue
is how they are constituted. In The Concept of Law, Hart proposed an answer.
When Dworkin first came on the scene, he challenged Hart's answer, but he
did not take issue with the question. In The Model of Rules, Dworkin presumed
that there is a distinctively legal domain of normativity. 60 He simply argued
that Hart was wrong about what it contained and how it was constituted. Hart
had said that the law is composed of rules, but Dworkin argued that the law
6o. Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967).
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contains principles as well.6' Hart had said that legal rules were picked out by a
socially constituted rule of recognition, but Dworkin rejected the thought that
one could distinguish a community's legal standards from its other standards
by appeal to a master rule.12
By the time Dworkin wrote The Model of Rules II, he had a very different
objection to Hart, an objection that prefigures the position defended in this Es-
say.6' Hart had argued that social rules are constituted by social practices. If
men regularly take their hats off when they enter church, and they regard that
regularity as supplying a standard of behavior, and they criticize one another
for deviations from that standard, then there is a rule that requires men to take
off their hats when they enter church. 6' But Dworkin said that Hart had the
connection between the practice and the rule all wrong. He wrote:
It is true that normative judgments often assume a social practice as an
essential part of the case for that judgment .... But the social rule theo-
ry misconceives the connection. It believes that the social practice consti-
tutes a rule which the normative judgment accepts; in fact the social
practice helps tojustify a rule which the normative judgment states. The
fact that a practice of removing hats in church exists justifies asserting a
normative rule to that effect- not because the practice constitutes a rule
which the normative judgment describes and endorses, but because the
practice creates ways of giving offense and gives rise to expectations of
the sort that are good grounds for asserting a duty to take off one's hat
in church or for asserting a normative rule that one must.
6 5
Take a moment to take that in: social practices do not constitute social rules,
which we first identify and then endorse or reject. Rather, they help to justify
normative rules, and the challenge is to figure out what rules they help to justi-
fy. 66 Dworkin drove this point home a couple paragraphs later, while imagin-
ing a debate about whether parents must take bonnets off male babies in
church.
It is true that [the churchgoers] will frame their dispute.., as a dispute
over what 'the rule' about hats in church requires. But the reference is
61. Id. at 23-29.
62. Id. at 45.
63. DwoRKiN, supra note 7, ch. 3.
64. HART, supra note 9, at 55-58.
65. DwoRKN, supra note 7, at 57.
66. For more on this point, see Nicos Stravropoulos, Words and Obligations, in READING HLA
HART'S THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123,126-33 (Luis Duarte d'Almeida et al. eds., 2013).
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not to the rule that is constituted by common behavior, that is, a social
rule, but the rule that is justified by common behavior, that is, a norma-
tive rule. They dispute precisely about what that rule is.
6
,
The point in these passages is the point I've been pushing all along. Our social
practices don't give rise to new kinds of normativity; rather, they warrant new
normative judgments of the old familiar kind. This is true even when the social
practice in question involves positing rules. As Dworkin put it:
The social rule theory fails because it insists that a practice must some-
how have the same content as the rule that individuals assert in its name.
But if we suppose simply that a practice may justify a rule, then while
the rule so justified may have the same content as the practice, it may
not; it may fall short of it, or go beyond it.
68
We have seen that this is true time and again with the social practices we have
interrogated. The rules posted in a rental house might or might not generate
obligations to do as directed. A promise might or might not generate an obliga-
tion to do as promised. Writing down rules for a game might or might not
generate an obligation to play the way they say. And enacting a law might or
might not generate an obligation to do as it demands. It all depends on the
content and context of the practice, and the obligations that are justified by the
practices can go beyond or fall short of the obligations that are posited within
them. But it is the obligations that are justified by our practices that we have
reason to care about; any interest we have in the obligations posited within
them is, at best, derivative.
To my thinking, Dworkin's remarks in the opening pages of The Model of
Rules II constitute the most incisive contribution that anyone has made to the
Hart-Dworkin debate. But almost as soon as he wrote them, he forgot them, or
maybe he never quite appreciated the importance of what he'd said in the first
place.6' By the time he wrote Law's Empire, Dworkin was back in Hart's
framework, trying to work out the relationship between our legal practices and
a distinctively legal domain of normativity. To be sure, he had a different an-
swer than Hart. Dworkin argued that morality played a role in determining our
distinctively legal rights, obligations, privileges, and powers. But he took for
granted that there was a distinctively legal domain of normativity.
67. DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 58.
68. Id.
69. The latter was Dworkin's self-diagnosis. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS
402(2011).
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It was only at the end of his life that Dworkin came to see his mistake. In
Justice for Hedgehogs, he said that he never should have accepted a "two-system"
picture, on which "'law' and 'morals' describe different collections of norms."7'
Instead, he said, he should have insisted on a one-system picture, which would
render law as a branch of morality. Roughly, Dworkin said, law is the branch
of morality that deals with rights that people are entitled to enforce on demand
in court.7' He might have added, though he didn't, that those rights are not
constituted by our legal practices, but rather are justified by them. The task of
courts is to figure out what rights and obligations are warranted by our legal
practices. And those rights might go beyond or fall short of the rights and obli-
gations that are posited within them.
Dworkin did not develop the one-system picture much, and there are some
questions about how best to interpret what little he said. Jeremy Waldron has
ventured some thoughts about how the one-system view should be fleshed out,
which are broadly consistent with what I have said here.' But he emphasizes
an essential point that I have not. The claim that legal rights are a species of
moral rights does not imply that the law is morally perfect, or even that we
have the legal rights it would be best for us to have. Waldron draws this point
out with an analogy to promising. Some promises are morally regrettable -
they ought not to have been made -but they might nevertheless have moral
significance. "In the case of the man who promised to cover up an illicit affair,"
Waldron suggests, "he might have an obligation to warn the erring husband
before speaking truthfully to the innocent wife or he might have an obligation
to avoid situations where the truth might be required of him. "' The first
sounds better to me than the second, but the point is that morality is sensitive
to our history, even when it is morally compromised. Law poses this problem
with a vengeance. Rare is the statute that says just what it morally ought to
have said. But morally compromised legislation might nevertheless have moral
significance, and courts are often called on to decide just what that significance
iS74is.
There is more wise counsel in Waldron's discussion of the one-system pic-
ture. But I think even he would agree that the ideas involved have received
their most important expression in the work of Mark Greenberg, who has re-
70. Id. at 400-02.
pi. Id. at 406-07.
72. See Waldron, supra note 3.
73. Id. at 23.
74. Id. at 26 (discussing the moral difference that wicked laws might make).
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cently articulated what he calls the moral impact theory of law.7' According to
Greenberg, our legal rights, obligations, privileges, and powers are the moral
rights, obligations, privileges, and powers generated by our legal practices in
what he calls "legally proper" ways.76 This is very close to the view that I've
endorsed here. Greenberg also rejects the idea that our legal practices generate
a distinctively legal domain of normativity, or quasi-normativity. And because
he does, his view has the virtues of the eliminativist position I have outlined.
But I worry that Greenberg is not fully out of the fly-bottle, or perhaps that
he is leaving one fly-bottle only to buzz into another. And before I close, I want
to see if I can explain what makes me reluctant to frame the task of jurispru-
dence as Greenberg does. Like Hart and Dworkin before him, Greenberg takes
himself to be telling us how the content of the law is constituted.7 On Green-
berg's picture, the content of the law consists in all the legal rights, obligations,
privileges, and powers in force in a given jurisdiction at a given time.7 The
great advance in Greenberg is that he does not think of these legal rights, obli-
gations, privileges, and powers as distinctively legal, for they are moral, too.
But he holds on to the view that our legal practices make something -the con-
tent of the law-whose metaphysics we must unravel.
I think that is a mistake. And early in his career- before he lapsed back into
Hart's framework-I think Dworkin would have too. Responding to Hart, he
wrote:
I hope to persuade lawyers to lay the entire picture of existing law aside
in favour of a theory of law that takes questions about legal rights as
special questions about political rights, so that one may think a plaintiff
has a certain legal right without supposing that any rule or principle
that already 'exists' provides that right.79
Greenberg signs on to part of this -the most important part. Though he puts
the point differently, he accepts Dworkin's suggestion that whether a plaintiff
has a legal right is a question of political morality. But Greenberg holds on to
75. Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, supra note 2; see also Waldron, supra note 3, at
12 n.32 (acknowledging Greenberg's influence).
76. Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, supra note 2, at 1321-23.
7. Id. at 1295-96 ("A theory (or view) of law, in the sense in which I use the term, is a constitu-
tive explanation of the content of the law-i.e., an explanation of which aspects of which
more basic facts are the determinants of legal content, and of how those determinants to-
gether make it the case that the various legal obligations, powers, and so on are what they
are.").
78. Id. at 1295.
79. DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 293.
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the idea that there is a body of "existing law," which encompasses the entire set
of legal rights, obligations, privileges, and powers in force in a legal system at a
given time, and he aims to say just what it is that makes something a member
of that set. At the end of his life, Dworkin seemed to share that ambition. As I
mentioned before, Dworkin suggested that law is the branch of morality that
deals with rights that people are entitled to enforce on demand in court.8s
Greenberg objects to that characterization of the law, because it "rule[s] out...
the possibility of legal obligations that the courts . . . should not enforce."'
That strikes Greenberg as a mistake because, he says, "it is a familiar idea that
the President and Congress may have legal duties that the courts should not
enforce. "s2 Instead, Greenberg suggests that the content of the law consists in
all the moral rights, obligations, privileges, and powers generated by the ac-
tions of legal institutions in legally proper ways. s3
What is at stake in this dispute? Not very much, and both Greenberg and
Dworkin acknowledge that. After observing that some lawyers talk as if the
Constitution confers legal rights that courts nevertheless should not enforce,
Dworkin says, "[t]his is indeed an available way to describe the situation: no
one would misunderstand. '" 4 He goes on to say that he prefers to employ a
8o. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
81. Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, supra note 2, at 13oo n.28.
82. Id. (citing Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitu-
tional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212 (1978)).
83. To fill out this picture, Greenberg will have to offer an account of what legal institutions are,
as well as an account of the legally proper ways for those institutions to affect our moral
rights and obligations. Greenberg says that these accounts are works in progress, see Green-
berg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, supra note 2, at 1323-25, and we should not prejudge
whether they will succeed. But it is worth noting just how tricky the task is. Greenberg ex-
plains one legally improper way of generating obligations- by making the moral situation
worse, so that people are obligated to mitigate the consequences of legal action. Id. at 1322.
He also suggests that there are other improper ways, though he says that more work is nec-
essary to identify them. Id. at 1323 & n.72. For an indication of the kinds of hurdles Green-
berg will face in filling out his account, consider the following case: Suppose that, as a result
of the protections afforded by the Whistleblower Protection Act, a federal employee has a
moral obligation to report some official misconduct. (I say "as a result of' to indicate that,
absent the statutory protections, morality would not require that employee to risk reprisal.)
The statute does not specify that she has that obligation, of course. It's just that the miscon-
duct is serious enough that she's morally obligated to report it. Is this obligation legal? The
Act has made the moral situation better. But it would seem odd to say that the employee is
legally obligated to report the misconduct. So some new criterion of legal properness will be
needed to cover this case, if indeed it can be covered. It may turn out that some small, intui-
tive set of criteria will cover most cases, but I worry that the impact of our legal practices on
our moral rights and obligations is so widespread and varied that it will be difficult to devel-
op criteria that do not seem ad hoc.
84. DWORKIN, supra note 69, at 412.
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"different vocabulary," which construes the constitutional rights that courts
should not enforce as "political but not legal." 8' He adds a few words in favor
of his preferred vocabulary, but once he allows that no one would misunder-
stand if we said the opposite, it is hard to see why we should insist on saying
things his way. Greenberg, for his part, allows that "the distinction[] between
legal and non-legal obligations" is "less important" on his theory than on oth-
ers. 86 This is because the question what obligations we classify as legal has no
bearing "on what we take our genuine obligations to be.",8 ' But Greenberg still
insists that his vocabulary is superior to Dworkin's. He says that "an account of
law should help us to explain why courts should enforce some rights and not
others. 88 Dworkin's account can't meet that test, since on his view legal rights
just are the rights that courts should enforce.
But that does not give us much reason, if any, to side with Greenberg. If we
employ Dworkin's vocabulary, then it is true that we will not be able to explain
why a court should enforce a right by observing that the right in question is a
legal one. We would instead have to point to the underlying considerations
that make it the case that the court should enforce the right. If instead we em-
ploy Greenberg's vocabulary, then saying that a right is legal might help ex-
plain why courts should enforce it. But that will be true only if Greenberg's use
of the label "legal" tracks the underlying considerations that warrant judicial
enforcement. That is, it will be true only if (absent countervailing considera-
tions) courts should enforce the rights generated by legal institutions in legally
proper ways. So whether we follow Greenberg or Dworkin, the underlying
considerations ultimately do all the explanatory work. Courts should enforce
whatever obligations they should enforce, and whether we use the label "legal"
to report the conclusion of that inquiry (as Dworkin suggests) or an intermedi-
ate step (as Greenberg prefers) in no way affects the substance of the decisions
that courts have to make. The only thing at stake is the way that we talk about
those decisions, and I see no reason to think that one vocabulary will always be
superior to the other.
The idea that we must settle on a single characterization of the law of our
community strikes me as a hangover from the picture of "existing law" that
Dworkin long ago proposed that we reject. If we suppose that, at any given
time, there exists a body of law that encompasses all the legal rights, obliga-
tions, privileges, and powers in force in a legal system, then it makes sense to
ask what is a part of it and what is not. But that picture has been the source of
85. Id.
86. Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, supra note 2, at 1323-24 n.73.
87. Id. at 1323.
88. Id. at 130o n.28.
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so much confusion that I think Dworkin was right to suggest that we leave it
behind.89 And there is little cost to doing so. A crude version of the picture
forms part of many laypeople's understanding of law. They suppose that our
legal rights and obligations are printed in the books that line the shelves of law
libraries, just waiting for lawyers to look them up. But that picture is too sim-
pleminded to survive even the first few days of law school. And though we
could make the picture more sophisticated, there is little return to doing so.
The thought that there is an existing body of law that comprises all the legal
rights, obligations, privileges, and powers in force in a legal system plays no
role in legal practice. Lawyers do not consult the law to ascertain what legal ob-
ligations people have. Rather, they read records of their community's legal his-
tory-statute books, case reports, and the like-and then they construct argu-
ments about what obligations people have as a result.
To be clear, I do not object to talking about what the law requires. What I
object to is the supposition that there is a single entity called the law to which
all such talk refers. As I said before, I am happy to allow that some of our moral
rights, obligations, privileges, and powers are helpfully labeled "legal." But
there are many helpful ways to use that label. If we want to signal the source of
our rights, then Greenberg's vocabulary might be useful. But if we want to sig-
nal which institutions have responsibility for vindicating our rights, then it
might be helpful to join Dworkin in distinguishing legal rights from political
rights. The ambition to characterize just one set of things as the law of our
community requires that we cast lots with Greenberg, or Dworkin, or someone
yet to come, because now that the issue has been mooted, there will be many
proposals for how to distinguish our legal rights from our merely moral rights.
But I do not see why we should feel pressure to pick just one way to character-
ize the legal domain. That strikes me as an invitation to another fly-bottle.
As I suggested earlier, we characterize the legal domain in different ways
for different purposes. Those who take a practical interest in law might con-
strue it differently depending on whether their concerns are primarily moral or
prudential.9" And even if we restrict our attention to morality, we might find
different characterizations of the law suitable for different occasions, or per-
89. Among other things, Dworkin suggested that the idea was responsible for the view that in
every case judges either apply existing law or make up new law, which he rightly regarded as
a false dichotomy. See DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 293. And he thought that the same idea en-
couraged "the assumption that non-positivists must believe in something called natural law,
which is taken to be the contents of celestial secret books." Id. at 337.
go. Those whose interest in the law is primarily theoretical -say, sociologists or historians -
might construe the law differently still. I suspect, however, that for at least some projects, it
will be important for them to track the views that those who take a practical interest in law
would or should draw.
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haps for people occupying different roles. It is not obvious to me, for example,
that a county clerk, a district judge, and a Supreme Court Justice should all
think about what the law requires in just the same way.91 When we have a pro-
ject in mind, we can ask whether it matters what notion of law we employ, and
which one to use if it does. But these are practical questions, not metaphysical
ones.
92
The time has come for jurisprudence to drop the metaphysics and take up
morals. The question that jurisprudence should aim to answer is how our legal
practices affect our moral rights, obligations, privileges, and powers. 93 The
metaphysical question posed in the Hart-Dworkin debate was a distraction; we
have no good reason to think that our legal practices generate a distinctively
legal domain of normativity, or quasi-normativity, whose metaphysics we must
unravel. But the moral question is vital; it is contested every day, in court and
out, with serious consequences for peoples' lives. Of course, philosophers have
thought about the moral question. There are answers all over the jurisprudence
literature: in Dworkin's comments on coercion;94 in Raz's reflections on au-
91. A county clerk denies a same-sex couple a marriage license because she takes herself to be
bound by a provision in the state constitution that bars same-sex marriage. In explaining
her decision, she concedes that the couple has a moral right to get married, but denies that
they have a legal right to a license. When the case is presented in court, the district judge or-
ders the county clerk to issue the license, on the ground that the state constitutional provi-
sion is inconsistent with the federal guarantee of equal protection. In doing so, the judge
says that the couple has a legal right to the license. Does she contradict what the clerk said
earlier? Perhaps, but it is also possible that the clerk and the judge are attaching the label
"legal" to the results of different inquiries, and sensibly so, given the nature of their offices.
Of course, the clerk could have said something different; she could have told the couple that
they had a legal right to the license, but that she was bound to treat them as if they did not,
unless and until she was ordered by a court to do otherwise. But she might have thought
that even that observation would overstep her role, so that it would be better to put things
in the first way rather than the second. To advise the clerk on what she should say when she
denies the license (and on whether she should deny it in the first place), we need to answer a
question about the morality of her role. We need to know what she should take into account
when deciding whether to issue a marriage license. We do not need to settle on a single
characterization of the law that everyone must employ on all occasions.
92. Some readers have suggested that I am multiplying metaphysical questions, not avoiding
them, since each project might have its own bespoke concept of law. But the point here is
that the right concept to employ is settled by practical considerations, so the metaphysics,
such as they are, reduce to the practical.
93. To ward off a common confusion, it is worth noting that we do not need to know the
boundaries of our legal practices in order to get this project started. We can ask whether we
have enough chairs for the party even if we cannot say exactly what chairs are. When a ques-
tion comes up - should we count the ottoman? - we will draw the boundary that best suits
our needs on that occasion, rather than attempt to settle, once and for all, whether an otto-
man is a chair.
94. DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 87-113.
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thority; 9' in Shapiro's paean to planning;, 6 and in Waldron's discussions of
disagreement.9 7 But rarely have these answers-and many more that I might
have cited-been engaged as answers to the moral question, because they are
usually attached to a metaphysical thesis, which draws all the attention. 8 For
far too long, the end of jurisprudence has been answering the question posed
by the Hart-Dworkin debate. That debate is at its end, but jurisprudence is
not. Jurisprudence does, however, need a new end. And we would do well to
worry more about the moral consequences of our legal practices.
95. RAZ, supra note 32, at 194-221.
96. See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 8.
97. See generally JEREMYWALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
98. Greenberg's work is a case in point, as his sterling discussion of the moral impact that legal
practices make, Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, supra note 2, at 1310-19, is at
risk of getting lost in the controversy over his metaphysical thesis.
124:1160 2015
I~I
